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1 Introduction
Many studies have highlighted the presence of a trade-off between some policy
objectives. The most famous one is the open economy policy trilemma theorized in the
Mundell–Fleming model (Mundell 1963; Fleming 1962). These authors have stressed
that it is not possible to have simultaneously: fixed exchange rates, independent
monetary policy and free capital mobility. Therefore, policy makers are forced to drop
one of these objectives and fulfill only two of them. Alternatively, they can choose a
combination of the three policy objectives in which none of them is fully achieved.
Member countries of the Eurozone do not face this trade-off anymore as the
launch of the common currency and the creation of the ECB have naturally solved
the impossible trinity by eliminating national and independent monetary policies.
These countries decided to abandon monetary independence, let capitals move
freely across the union, and share a common currency.
Nevertheless, the recent economic upheavals that have hit the Eurozone have also
been interpreted as the signals of the existence of other trade-offs between policy
objectives in the EMU. Then, other trilemmas, specific for the Eurozone, have been
proposed by Pisani-Ferry (2012) and Obstfeld (2013). Despite their different
approach to the problem, both contributions focus on the interactions between
financial markets and fiscal policy and highlight the difficulties in reconciling the
contemporaneous existence of capital market integration, financial stability and the
ability to manage fiscal accounts.
Therefore, in this study we focus on a possible trade-off that should make it
impossible to simultaneously achieve: (1) free capital mobility; (2) fiscal policy
flexibility; and (3) financial stability. We can refer to this trade-off as the monetary
union trilemma and it suggests that, in a currency union like the EMU, it is impossible
for member countries to fully achieve all these three objectives simultaneously.
We analyze the theoretical and institutional foundations for the monetary union
trilemma and empirically investigate the existence of such a trade-off in the
countries of the Eurozone. We include 11 EMU member countries (Austria,
Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal
and Spain) in our dataset and conduct our analysis on the basis of quarterly data
spanning the period 1999q1–2012q4. The results support the idea of the existence of
a relation between the policy variables, demonstrating that one of the policy
objectives can be reached at the expenses of one of the others or a combination of
two. This implies that the monetary union trilemma is binding in the Eurozone
although we also show that some differences across member countries characterize
its configuration. In our view, the existence of such a trade-off provides arguments
for implementing centralized financial supervision together with fiscal and monetary
reforms in order to build up a stronger currency union.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2 we explain the theoretical and
institutional foundations for the monetary union trilemma, and how it applies to the
Eurozone. In Sect. 3 we report the data used and show how the indicators to study
the existence of the trade-off between the variables in the trilemma have been
constructed. The results of the empirical analysis are reported and commented in
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Sect. 4. In Sect. 5 we analyze the robustness of our results. In Sect. 6 we conclude
the paper and provide some policy implications.
2 Currency unions and the monetary union trilemma
According to the optimum currency areas (OCA) theory, financial market
integration is one of the main criteria for a successful monetary union. The main
justification supporting financial integration is that in its presence the impact of
asymmetric shocks is diminished. A currency union is sustainable even under
asymmetric shocks as long as its member countries are able to insure each other
thanks to financial integration. This insurance acts through a risk-sharing
mechanism between member countries (see Mundell 1973a, b; McKinnon 2004)
when residents in one country hold claims on the dividends, interests and rental
revenues from other countries. This should be able to reduce the degree of
asymmetric impact of the shocks. Similar reasoning is followed by Ingram (1962) in
stating that exchange rate adjustments are less needed under financial integration as
the latter should be able to cushion temporary adverse disturbances thanks to capital
flows. Moreover, financial integration should make the transmission of monetary
policy smoother and more symmetric across member countries. These are all
reasons that explain why strengthening financial openness has always been one of
the main objectives of the EMU authorities.
Another important issue in a currency union relates to the conduct of fiscal
policy. As long as there is not a substantial level of political integration, fiscal
policies are conducted by national governments. Therefore, mechanisms able to
safeguard fiscal policy coordination and discipline are necessary. To this aim, rules
and institutions have been created in the Eurozone. Despite these common rules, due
to the loss of the monetary instrument, fiscal policy is responsible for stabilizing the
economy against asymmetric shocks in a currency union. Therefore, fiscal flexibility
is a relevant policy objective for each member country. Nevertheless, in the EMU
framework the smoothing of the cycle has to rely on automatic fiscal stabilizers
rather than active policies (see Brunila et al. 2002).
Recent economic developments (financial and sovereign debt crises) suggest that
a negative interaction between financial markets and fiscal policy can take place in
the Eurozone. As shown by Ardagna (2009) and Foresti and Napolitano (2017),
financial markets value fiscal discipline, as they react positively after fiscal
consolidations and negatively after fiscal expansions. As a consequence, financial
markets can constrain the fiscal policy choices. In a monetary union without a lender
of last resort, with no centralized budget, with high level of capital mobility and no
banking union, it can be argued that such influence can be even amplified, especially
in periods of intense borrowing by member countries. Further support for this idea is
provided by De Grauwe and Ji (2013), showing that during the sovereign debt crisis
in the Eurozone, fiscal austerity has been the outcome of fear and panic in the
financial market (with this impact amplified by free capital mobility). As a result,
fiscal policy decisions in Europe have been constrained by the dynamics of the
financial market.
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These interactions between financial markets and fiscal policy can be synthesized
in the existence of a trade-off according to which it is hard to reconcile the
contemporaneous existence of free capital flows, financial stability and the ability to
manage fiscal accounts. This incompatibility has been enunciated in different ways
in the literature.
According to Pisani-Ferry (2012), in the Eurozone the absence of co-responsi-
bility over public debt, the strict no-monetary financing rule and the national
character of banking systems cannot contemporaneously exist. Since single
countries have to autonomously manage their public debt without being able to
count on the monetary financing of the central bank, during declining macroeco-
nomic conditions they face the risk of insolvency. This in turn reduces the capital
inflows and increases financial instability. Obstfeld (2013) describes the trilemma
dimensions as those related to the single countries’ inability to finance counter-
cyclical fiscal policies in presence of macroeconomic downturns and at the same
time have financial integration and financial stability. The reduced willingness of
foreign capital to finance additional public expenditure increases interest rates and
forces governments to implement fiscal retrenchments to restore market confidence.
We use these theoretical intuitions in this study and we show, through empirical
estimates, the existence of a new policy trade-off for the Eurozone member
countries. It implies that Eurozone countries cannot fully achieve free capital
mobility, financial stability and fiscal policy flexibility at the same time.
The monetary union trilemma is illustrated by an equilateral triangle as in Fig. 1.
The three corners represent financial stability, free capital mobility, and fiscal policy
flexibility, respectively.
Fig. 1 The Trilemma Triangle
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According to the theorized trade-off, it is not possible to fully achieve the three
policy objectives, but it is possible to achieve two of them by standing on one of the
sides of the triangle (that is equivalent to standing in two corners of the triangle).
As only two—out of three—policy goals can be achieved to their full extent, we
observe three distinctive extreme policy combinations (trilemma configurations):
(1) fully open financial markets and full fiscal policy flexibility (implying no
financial stability); (2) fully stable financial markets and full fiscal policy flexibility
(with authorities forced to impose capital controls); (3) fully stable and open
financial markets (thereby forcing the authorities to give up full fiscal policy
flexibility). It is worth noting that the possible trilemma configurations imply also
combinations in which each policy goal is neither fully achieved nor totally
dropped.
The empirical evidence of the existence of such a policy trilemma can provide a
new perspective in order to examine national macroeconomic policies choices in the
EMU, as well as to suggest possible beneficial reforms.
3 The trilemma indicators
The first step in order to capture the trade-off between the policy variables involved
in the trilemma requires the selection of an appropriate set of indexes. According to
Fig. 1, we evaluate the EMU trilemma trough: (1) a free capital mobility index
(FCM); (2) a financial stability index (FS); and (3) a fiscal policy flexibility index
(FPF).
We construct the three indexes so that each of them falls between 0 and 1. The
indexes are constructed in the way that the value of 1 represents the maximum level
of financial stability, a perfect degree of capital market openness, and the highest
level of fiscal policy flexibility. The opposite is when the indexes assume the value
of 0.
3.1 Free capital mobility index (FCM)
In constructing the FCM index our focus is on financial account openness.
Among quantity-based measures, the index proposed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti
(2003) is probably the most extensively used de facto measure of a country’s
exposure to international financial markets. It is calculated as a country’s aggregate
financial assets plus liabilities relative to its gross domestic product. Our measure of
capital mobility, a de facto degree of financial openness measured by total capital
flows, is the ratio of gross stocks of foreign assets plus liabilities relative to GDP,
similar as in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006). Our indicator relies on the Balance of
Payment database published by the International Monetary Fund, based on the
BPM6 classification.
The index is calculated as follows:
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FCMi;t ¼
FAþ FLð Þi;t FAþ FLð Þmin
FAþ FLð Þmax FAþ FLð Þmin
ð1Þ
where FA and FL are financial assets and liabilities divided by the GDP. In par-
ticular, they include: direct investments, portfolio investments, other investments
and reserves.1
Hence, the FCM index describes the financial account openness and it is based on
the sum in absolute values of capital flows. According to Eq. (1), the FCM index for
country i at time t is normalized between 0 and 1 by using the maximum and
minimum values in the entire panel. Therefore, perfectly open financial markets are
represented by a value of 1 in the FCM index.2 Given that all the indicators adopted
in this section are normalized in the same way as the FCM index (1), it is worth
noting that their values should be interpreted as relative and not absolute.
3.2 Financial stability index (FS)
Financial stability is difficult to define and even more difficult to measure. Strictly
speaking, a financial system can be characterized as stable in the absence of
excessive volatility, stress or crises.
Financial stability has again shifted into the center of attention, especially since
the beginning of the recent global financial crisis. To be able to detect potential
pressures on financial stability and take appropriate macro prudential measures early
on, economists and policymakers need to monitor and assess the degree of financial
stability. From the recent financial crisis we know that there is a very broad range of
indicators that must be monitored to assess overall financial stability in a reliable
manner. This is because globalization, financial innovation and technological
progress have accelerated many financial processes and have generated new and
more complicated transmission channels. Country specific financial stability indexes
have been constructed e.g. by Sales et al. (2012), by Brave and Butters (2011) or by
Illing and Liu (2003). Nelson and Perli (2005) and Gersˇl and Hermanek (2008)
discuss the methodology of selected financial soundness and financial stability
indicators. Among the commonly used quantitative methods for financial stability
assessment, we consider an aggregate financial stability index based on the financial
instability indicator proposed by Jakubı´k and Slacˇı´k (2013).
We first compute a measure of overall financial instability by considering
interbank, stock and government bond markets as indicated in Table 1.
Then, our overall financial stability index is constructed as:
FSi;t ¼ 1 FIi;t  FImin
FImax  FImin ð2Þ
Therefore, we have normalized the indicator of financial instability in country i at
time t (FIi;t) between 0 and 1 and then the relative normalized financial stability
1 See IMF (2009) for a precise description of each aggregate.
2 In the normalization of the indexes, possible outliers have been treated by winsorization at 90% (see
Tukey 1962).
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index (FSi;t) is calculated according to Eq. (2). From this equation, it is clear that
complete financial stability is represented by a value of 1 in the index.
Quarterly interbank rates are from the OECD database, while quarterly 10-year
bond yields data are from the IMF database. Stock market indexes are ibex35
(Spain), dax (Germany), mib storico (Italy), cac40 (France), athex composite
(Greece), bel20 (Belgium), atx (Austria), aex (Netherlands), psi20 (Portugal), iseq
overall (Ireland) and hexpic (Finland). These series have been obtained from
individual indexes and national stock exchange websites at daily frequency and then
converted into quarterly averages.
3.3 Fiscal policy flexibility index (FPF)
In general, fiscal and monetary policies are linked through the government’s budget
constraint. A combination of taxes, new debt issue, and seigniorage revenues must
finance governments’ expenditures in every period. In terms of the intertemporal
budget constraint, outstanding debt must be backed by a combination of the present
discounted value of current and future primary surpluses and seigniorage revenues.
Nevertheless, given the impossibility for the ECB to finance national budget
deficits, taxes and new debt issue are the only way by which national governments
of the Eurozone can finance their deficits.
In the Eurozone, the responsibility for fiscal policy is left to national
governments, but rules (SGP and Fiscal Compact) have been imposed in order to
limit the flexibility of national fiscal manoeuvers. We assume that the conduct of
fiscal policy by a single member of the EMU should be considered as flexible when
it is able to be independent from the other member countries. In this sense, we
consider fiscal flexibility as a synonym for fiscal independence from the other
members’ fiscal stance. In contrast, the SGP imposes that member countries’ fiscal
policies should be synchronized regardless of the national business cycles.
Therefore, the extent of national fiscal flexibility in country i at time t is measured
as the deviation of the national primary deficit (defi,t) from the average primary
deficit in the rest of the EMU countries in the dataset (defemu,t). Both defi,t and
defemu,t are considered as a percentage of GDP.
It is worth noting that the deviations between the fiscal stances in different
countries may be strongly influenced by the business cycle. We addressed this issue
Table 1 Financial instability index (FI)
Market Weight Sub-index Sub-weight
Money marketa 1/3 Money market volatility 1/2
Money market year-on-year change 1/2
Equity market 1/3 Stock index volatility 1/2
Stock index year-on-year change 1/2
Bond market 1/3 10-year government bond volatility 1/2
10-year government bond year-on-year change 1/2
aBased on three-month interbank offered rates
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by regressing the primary deficit on GDP for each country and then by using the
residuals as a measure of the fiscal policy (defi,t) in each member state.
Therefore, our indicator of fiscal policy flexibility is calculated as:
FPFi;t ¼ Ddefi;t  DdefminDdefmax  Ddefmin ð3Þ
where Ddefi;t ¼ defi;t  defemu;t



. Also this index lies between 0 and 1 with a higher
value indicating greater degree of fiscal independence. In this case, data are
obtained from the Oxford Economics database.
3.4 Tracking the trilemma indexes
In our study, we focus on 11 countries of the EMU (Austria, Belgium, Finland,
France, Greece, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain) and
adopt quarterly data spanning the period 1999q1–2012q4.
Before performing the empirical analysis and verify the existence of the
trilemma, we briefly summarize our data in order to evaluate how the constructed
indexes vary across time and countries.
First, we use the radar charts in order to show the panel average values of the
three indicators in the entire period covered by the dataset (Fig. 2, panel A) and in
three sub-periods (Fig. 2, panel B). In the radar charts the origin represents zero
capital flows, no fiscal policy flexibility and maximum financial instability.
Figure 2, panel A, shows that financial stability has a higher average value (0.58)
when compared to fiscal independence (0.32) and free capital mobility (0.35). Then,
from the entire panel perspective it can be concluded that safeguarding financial
stability has been prioritized and that EMU countries have substantially retained
fiscal independence. However, Fig. 2 panel B shows how the link between the three
indexes has varied over time. We can observe how the financial stability indicator
slightly increases in the first two sub-periods going from 0.63 to 0.72, but then
Fig. 2 The trilemma indexes in the panel and time dimensions
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sharply declines with an average value of 0.37 after 2008. This result should not be
surprising as the latter is exactly the period of the global financial crisis.
Remarkably, in the same time-span, fiscal flexibility augments from 0.22 to 0.40 on
average. This can be interpreted as the result of the asymmetric effects of the
financial crisis in Europe. Following the asymmetric impact of the financial shocks,
some member countries of the EMU have reacted by implementing fiscal policies
not in line with the ones in the rest of the EMU. Such divergence between different
national fiscal policies is the main reason behind the increase in our index of fiscal
flexibility. Hence, this descriptive analysis suggests that financial instability has
affected fiscal policy decisions.
Furthermore, from this descriptive analysis, it seems that the increase in one
indicator has implied a reduction in another one. Table 2 reports the value from
Fig. 2 panel A together with standard deviations. Furthermore, the table reports the
country and quarter in which the panel maximum and minimum for each index are
observed. Noticeably, the minimum value for financial stability is scored by Greece,
while the maximum fiscal flexibility by Ireland and both fall in the period of the
crisis.
Finally, in Table 2 we also show for which countries and in which periods the
normalized and winsorized indicators are for at least 1 year at their maximum or
minimum values. Again, this shows how severe and prolonged financial instability
has occurred in Greece and Portugal during the financial crisis, while strong fiscal
independence has been evidenced for Spain and Ireland during the crisis.
Table 2 Summary of the trilemma indexes
FS FPF FCM
Mean 0.58 0.32 0.35
SD 0.27 0.27 0.28
Max Italy—2004q3 Ireland—2010q2 Belgium—2008q4
Min Greece—2012q4 Belgium—2002q1 France—2012q4
Max
(1 year)
France 2004q3–2005q2
Portugal 2004q3–2005q4
Ireland 2004q2–2007q2
Ireland 2009q4–2011q1
Spain 2011q2–2012q4
Netherlands 2005q1–2006q1
Austria 2005q1–2005q4
Belgium 2007q4–2008q4
Min
(1 year)
Greece 2010q2–2012q4
Portugal 2011q2–2012q4
Greece 1999q1–2000q1
France—1999q1–1999q4
Netherlands—2012q1–2012q4
Germany 2001q2–2002q1
Max and Min refer to the panel maximum and minimum values of the indexes
Max (1 year) refers to periods of at least 1 year in which the index has scored its maximum after
winsorization
Min (1 year) refers to periods of at least 1 year in which the index has scored its minimum after
winsorization
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4 Empirical analysis and results
The existence of policy alternatives inside the traditional Mundell–Fleming trilemma
was first estimated by Aizenman et al. (2008) and then applied in other studies (see for
instance Hutchison et al. 2012; Aizenman et al. 2015; Aizenman and Ito 2014).
In this section, we empirically investigate the existence of the monetary union
trilemma for the EMU countries in our sample considered both as a whole union and
individually.
To show that countries in the EMU have faced the monetary union impossible
trinity, it has to be demonstrated that there is a trade-off between the policy goals of
national fiscal policy flexibility, financial stability and free capital flows and that
policy makers have to define a weighted average combining the three goals.
The simplest way to test the existence of the trilemma is to suppose a linear relation.
Following Aizenman et al. (2008, 2013), a linear trilemma can be estimated by testing
that the weighted sum of the three policy variables adds up to a constant. If this is
verified, it implies that, in the case of the monetary union trilemma, higher financial
stability should linearly induce lower capital mobility or lower fiscal flexibility, or a
combination of these two policy adjustments. In particular, this implies to examine the
goodness of fit of the following linear regression:
1 ¼ a1FPFi;t þ a2FSi;t þ a3FCMi;t þ ei;t ð4Þ
according to which the weighted sum of the indexes of Eqs. (1), (2) and (3) adds up
to 1.3 If we find that the goodness of fit of Eq. (4) is high, it would suggest that the
trade-off is binding and that the specification is rich enough to explain it. Therefore,
the higher the goodness of fit of the estimated model the stronger the support for the
existence of the trilemma.
An alternative specification is a logarithmic one (see Hsing 2012):
1 ¼ b1lnFPFi;t þ b2lnFSi;t þ b3lnFCMi;t þ li;t ð5Þ
where in order to avoid zero values, a value of 1 is added to each indicator before
taking its logarithm.
As a first step of our analysis, we compare the outcomes of the linear estimation
of Eq. (4) with the results obtained by the linear-logarithmic specification (5).
Table 3 (panel A) reports the results of the estimations of Eqs. (4) and (5).
The two regressions provide similar estimated coefficients that are all statistically
significant at 1%. Then, in order to choose one of the two non-nested models, we
first compare them by means of the Davidson and MacKinnon (1981) procedure.
The F-test connected with this method suggests that neither of the models has to be
rejected (see Table 3, panel B).
Therefore, we compare the two models on the basis of their estimated errors (via
the Box-Cox procedure), AIC and R2, respectively. The results reported in Table 3,
3 Geometrically, the trilemma constraint given by Eq. (4) represents the sum of the perpendicular
distances from a generic point in the triangle to its sides. This is valid for any point and the sum of such
distances is always a constant equal to the altitude of the triangle (Viviani’s theorem), that in our case is
equal to 1.
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panel B, suggest that the logarithmic regression has the lowest values of the errors
standard deviation, mean absolute percent error, sum of squared errors, and Akaike
information criterion. Moreover, it also shows a higher R2.
Therefore, we decide to conduct our analysis on the basis of Eq. (5); it is first
estimated for the entire panel and full sample period. In the case of a high goodness
of fit of this regression and positive estimated coefficients, it can be concluded that
Eq. (5) is able to model the trade-off between the three policy variables.
Conversely, a low goodness of fit and/or negative estimated coefficients would
indicate that the theory behind the trilemma is not correct, or that the relationship
between its variables cannot be represented with the adopted functional form.
The relevant results from the panel estimation of Eq. (5) are summarized in
Table 4. As already shown in Table 3, all the three variables are highly statistically
significant, the estimated coefficients have positive sign and the general fit is good.
All these elements suggest that the existence of the monetary union policy trilemma
cannot be rejected.4 Therefore, this constitutes evidence that the member countries
of the EMU face an impossible trinity between free capital mobility, financial
stability and flexible national fiscal policies.
It is worth noting that the estimated coefficients do not provide accurate measure
of the weights that each policy goal has in the trilemma. However, it is crucial to
know these weights in order to quantify the trilemma configuration.
In order to obtain these weights, we have to multiply the estimated coefficients by
the actual values of the variables. Hence, we calculate the weights characterizing the
trilemma configuration for fiscal policy flexibility, financial stability and free capital
mobility as b^1  lnFPF; b^2  lnFS and b^3  lnFCM; respectively. Where
lnFPF; lnFS and lnFCM are the panel sample means of each variable reported in
the third column of Table 4, while b^1; b^2 and b^3 are the estimated coefficients from
Eq. (5). Thus, in the fourth column of Table 4 we report the calculated contribution
of each policy goal to the trilemma configuration. If the approximation is
satisfactory, the sum of these weights should be close to 1. Then, in the note of
Table 4 we also report the R2, that must coincide with the sum of the three
calculated weights and therefore measures the relevance of the trilemma according
to the data. This makes it clear why higher levels of the R2 imply stronger evidence
for the existence of the trilemma. In our estimation, its high value supports the
existence of the trade-off.
4 On the contrary, estimated negative coefficients, or a low R2, would have suggested that the
hypothesized trade-off is not binding, or that the specification adopted is not appropriate.
Table 4 Panel estimation of the trilemma
Estimated coefficient Sample mean Contribution (weight)
FPF 0.747*** (0.053) 0.259 0.19
FS 1.239*** (0.039) 0.443 0.55
FCM 0.615*** (0.054) 0.283 0.17
Sum of contributions (R2) = 0.91
*** Indicates level of significance at 1%. Standard errors in parentheses
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Furthermore, the estimated weights assigned to each policy goal show that the
main focus has been on financial stability, that has a weight of 0.55, while the
estimated contributions to the trade-off of fiscal policy flexibility and free capital
mobility are 0.19 and 0.17, respectively. Therefore, our results suggest that the
trilemma is binding in the Eurozone, and that the main weight in its configuration
has been on financial stability. This reflects the general trend in the EMU, where
national fiscal policies have most often been synchronized in order to fulfill the
common rules and the imposed fiscal policy constraints.
Given the length of our dataset, the results obtained so far may be due to different
trilemma configurations over the years in the EMU. Hence, we also perform our
panel analysis for the same three sub-periods adopted in the descriptive analysis of
data (1999q1–2003q4, 2004q1–2008q2 and 2008q3–2012q4). We have chosen to
split the sample at 2008q3 due to the beginning of the financial crisis. This intuition
has also been confirmed by a Chow stability test showing that there is a structural
break at that point.5 Moreover, we have divided the sample in three sub-periods,
adopting 2004q1 as another threshold, in order to compare estimations covering the
same number of years.
Thus, thanks to this analysis, we are able to separately cover the period of the
financial crisis and compare its trilemma configuration with the ones characterizing
the beginning of the EMU experience and following years. The results are reported
in Table 5. The three sub-periods estimations confirm the result that the trilemma is
binding.
5 Results of the structural break analysis are available upon request.
Table 5 Panel Estimations in Different Time Periods
Estimated coefficient Sample mean Contribution (weight)
1999q1–2003q4
FPF 0.958*** (0.112) 0.186 0.18
FS 1.318*** (0.057) 0.478 0.63
FCM 0.479*** (0.087) 0.269 0.13
2004q1–2008q2
FPF 0.322*** (0.063) 0.289 0.09
FS 1.365*** (0.046) 0.536 0.73
FCM 0.424*** (0.063) 0.319 0.14
2008q3–2012q4
FPF 0.878*** (0.094) 0.312 0.27
FS 1.298*** (0.101) 0.299 0.39
FCM 0.924*** (0.104) 0.258 0.24
For the normalization of the indexes, the maximum and minimum adopted are the ones of the entire
sample
Sum of contributions (R2) are: 0.94 for 1999q1–2003q4; 0.96 for 2004q1–2008q2; 0.90 for
2008q3–2012q4
*** Indicates level of significance at 1%. Standard errors in parentheses
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It is clear that the trilemma configuration has been similar in the first two sub-
periods, with strong emphasis on financial stability and low weight assigned to fiscal
flexibility.
The latter can be interpreted as a general evidence of both fiscal discipline and
co-movements in the EMU in order to safeguard financial stability.
Noticeably, the degree of fiscal flexibility is very low in the period
2004q1–2008q2 and this can be considered as evidence of the fact that the crisis
was not linked to previous fiscal policy decisions and that, on the contrary, fiscal
policies were similar across different member countries in the pre-crisis period.
Then, starting from the financial crisis, in the period 2008q3–2012q4, the
trilemma configuration shows some changes as the weight of financial stability is
reduced from 0.73 to 0.39 and the weight of fiscal flexibility increases from 0.09 to
0.27. This can be interpreted as the consequence of the increase in financial
instability characterizing the period of the crisis that has forced some of the member
countries to modify their fiscal stance more than in the rest of the union. The
asymmetric impact of the financial shocks has then forced some member countries
to react by performing fiscal manoeuvers not in line with the ones of the rest of the
EMU. As a result, our fiscal policy flexibility indicator has increased given the fact
that similarities in national fiscal stances have declined. This change in the degree of
fiscal flexibility has then modified the trilemma configuration.6
Another relevant element connected with our analysis is that estimating the
existence of the trilemma by using a pooled panel estimation method may be
misleading because an increase in one of the indexes for one member country may
involve a fall in the weighted sum of the other two indexes in another country, but a
pooled estimation may still interpret this as a relation between the three indexes for
each country (see Aizenman et al. 2013). Therefore, in order to validate our
findings, we also test the relation between the trilemma variables for each country
separately.7 The estimated trilemma configurations are reported, both graphically
and numerically, in Fig. 3.
First, according to our estimations, the validity of the monetary union trilemma
can be confidently confirmed also from the perspective of single countries
estimations as all the estimated coefficients are positive and the R2 is consistently
high across countries. The results concerning the configuration of the trade-off also
show that financial stability receives high weight in the trilemma in the large
majority of countries. Therefore, the general result from the panel analysis is
confirmed.
Nevertheless, Fig. 3 highlights some relevant differences between countries.
Firstly, Greece, Ireland and Portugal show substantially lower weights of financial
stability when compared with the rest of the union. At the same time, Greece seems
to have combined this lower weight on financial stability with more flexible fiscal
policies.
6 One can argue that also the tightening of the institutional restrictions on deficits should have impacted
the degree of fiscal flexibility in Europe. However, these reforms have started only after 2010 and their
impact is not represented in our data set.
7 In this case, the weights of the variables in the trilemma configuration are calculated by multiplying the
coefficients estimated with single countries regression by the country mean of each variable.
190 R. R. Canale et al.
123
Figure 3 also shows how the lowest weights for fiscal flexibility are estimated in
the case of Portugal, Italy, Netherlands and Belgium.
The differences between countries highlighted in Fig. 3 suggest the necessity of
additional work strictly focusing on a cross-section analysis of the trilemma
configurations and linking these to the economic and institutional characteristics of
each country. However, this goes beyond the scope of the present paper.
5 Robustness analysis
In this section, we present the outcomes of several alternative estimations in order to
test the robustness of our results and provide some additional insights. We focus on
three aspects related to our estimations: (1) we investigate if our results depend on
the estimation method adopted; (2) as the employed indicators have some elements
of arbitrariness, we consider alternative definitions of such variables in order to test
the robustness of our results; (3) in order to support the specificity of the trilemma
Estimated Contributions (weights)
Austria Belgium Finland France Germany Netherlands Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain
FPF 0.26*** 0.06*** 0.13*** 0.23*** 0.48*** 0.10** 0.31*** 0.15** 0.07 0.05 0.23***
FS 0.52*** 0.52*** 0.42*** 0.71*** 0.46*** 0.39*** 0.35*** 0.24*** 0.59*** 0.32*** 0.70***
FCM 0.17*** 0.38*** 0.43*** 0.01 0.03* 0.43*** 0.24*** 0.51*** 0.25*** 0.59*** 0.02
Sum of 
Contributions 
(R2)
0.95 0.96 0.98 0.95 0.97 0.92 0.90 0.90 0.91 0.96 0.95
Note: Values refer to the trilemma weights, while asterisks refer to the statistical signiicance of the estimated coeficients adopted for the calculation 
of the weights. *,**,*** Indicate level of signiicance of the estimated coeficients at 10, 5 and 1%, respectively.
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Fig. 3 Trilemma configurations in single member countries
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for countries in the EMU, we also verify that the trade-off implied by the trilemma
is not binding for a different group of countries outside the EMU.
5.1 Alternative estimation methods
As already highlighted in Sect. 4, specification errors and methods of estimation
may affect the results obtained concerning the trilemma configuration. Besides the
alternative between a linear and a logarithmic specification, other possible
estimations considered in the literature imply estimating a trilemma equation via
two-stage least squares, Kalman filter and tobit (see for instance Ito and Kawai
2014; Cortuk and Singh 2013). Therefore, we re-estimate Eq. (5) by means of two
alternative methods: (1) the two stage least squares and (2) the Kalman filter.
Trilemma estimations force the number of explanatory variables to be three and
are then prone to endogeneity problems due to omitted variables. Moreover, in our
case measurement errors can characterize for instance the fiscal policy variable
because quarterly data on fiscal policies are based on cash data and estimations.
Therefore, following the standard approach in dealing with endogeneity, we
estimate Eq. (5) using instrumental variables regression. In the two-stage least
squares estimation we use lagged observations for the free capital mobility and
fiscal policy flexibility indexes as instruments.8 The results reported in Table 6
highlight the fact that this estimation basically confirms the initial results obtained
from the estimation of Eq. (5), both in terms of goodness of fit and trilemma
configuration.
Another possibility implies employing the Kalman filter technique in the context
of the trilemma regression by allowing its coefficients to vary over time. In order to
Table 6 Panel estimation of the trilemma controlling for estimation methods
Estimated coefficient Sample mean Contribution (weight)
Two-stage least squares
FPF 0.811*** (0.063) 0.259 0.21
FS 1.166*** (0.063) 0.443 0.52
FCM 0.694*** (0.042) 0.283 0.20
Kalman Filter
FPF 0.747*** (0.053) 0.259 0.19
FS 1.239*** (0.039) 0.443 0.55
FCM 0.614*** (0.054) 0.283 0.17
In the 2-SLS the variables FCM and FPF are instrumented with their lags
Sum of contributions (R2) for the two-stage least squares estimation = 0.93
Sum of contributions (R2) for the Kalman filter estimation = 0.91
*** Indicates level of significance at 1%. Standard errors in parentheses
8 We have also estimated Eq. (5) by using lagged variables of all the three indexes as instruments and the
results obtained are similar to the ones reported in Table 6.
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employ the Kalman filter, we have to represent our trilemma equation in state-space
form. This requires a measurement equation:
1 ¼ b1;tlnFPFi;t þ b2;tlnFSi;t þ b3;tlnFCMi;t þ gi;t ð6Þ
and three transition equations:
b1;t ¼ q1b1;t1 þ ct; b2;t ¼ q2b2;t1 þ mt; b3;t ¼ q3b3;t1 þ dt ð7Þ
where gi;t; ct; mt; and dt are assumed to be normally distributed with zero mean. The
measurement equation is our main trilemma regression, while according to the
transition equations we treat the parameters of the trilemma indexes as unobserved
and allow them to vary over time as AR(1) processes. As shown in Table 6, also the
Kalman filter results are almost identical to the ones presented in Table 4.
Another part of our estimation that requires further investigation is the sub-
periods analysis summarized in Table 5. This is due to the fact that the limited
number of observations involved in each sub-period may have affected the
estimation results and their reliability. Hence, we use dummies for the subsamples
interacted with all variables and run one regression with interactions instead of 3
separate regressions. This methodology considers the use of interaction dummy
variables and it allows the coefficients of the relationship between the dependent
variable and the independent variables to be different depending on whether the
condition specified by a dummy variable is met. In our case, these conditions are
related to the three different sub-periods (1999q1–2003q4, 2004q1–2008q2 and
2008q3–2012q4) and the dummies are D1, D2 and D3 like in the following
regression:
1 ¼b1D1lnFPFi;t þ b2D1lnFSi;t þ b3D1lnFCMi;t þ b4D2lnFPFi;t
þ b5D2lnFSi;t þ b6D2lnFCMi;t þ b7D3lnFPFi;t
þ b8D3lnFSi;t þ b9D3lnFCMi;t þ li;t
ð8Þ
We report the estimation results from Eq. (8) in Table 7. Again, the results in
Table 7 match the ones reported in Table 5 as also by using Eq. (8) we can
conclude that the trilemma configuration has been constant during the first two sub-
periods and that strong emphasis on financial stability and low weight to fiscal
flexibility have characterized the trilemma configuration in these two periods.
Furthermore, the degree of fiscal flexibility has been low in the period 2004q1-
2008q2 and this confirms our results showing that the crisis was not linked to
previous fiscal policy decisions. The dummy variables estimation also confirms that,
starting from the financial crisis, the trilemma configuration has changed as the
weight of financial stability has reduced and the weight of fiscal flexibility has
increased.
Thus, from the analyses conducted in this section we can conclude that our main
results can be considered as not depending on the estimation method adopted.
Is there a trade-off between free capital mobility… 193
123
5.2 Alternative indicators
In this section we re-estimate Eq. (5) by employing alternative measures of the
trilemma indicators. Specifically, we employ two alternative indicators measuring
financial stability, two further indicators for fiscal policy flexibility and one
additional indicator for free capital mobility.
5.2.1 Alternative financial stability indicators
Concerning the financial stability indicator, we adopt two additional measures to
verify the robustness of our results. First, we employ a narrower version of our
indicator focusing on the government bond market that is calculated as:
FS1i;t ¼ 1
FI1i;t  FI1min
FI1max  FI1min
ð9Þ
where FI1i;t is the instability on the government bond market for country i at time
t calculated as in Table 1. Thus, FI1i;t is the average between the volatility and the
year-on-year change of the 10-year government bond yields. Then, the alternative
indicator measuring financial stability is constructed according to Eq. (9). The
results are reported in Table 8, panel A, and confirm the existence of the trilemma.
The trilemma configuration in this case shows a slightly higher weight for
financial stability reflecting the stronger link between fiscal policy decisions and the
variations of the bond yields.
As the two financial stability indexes employed so far rely on the same logic for
their calculation, we also estimate the trilemma indicator by employing a different
Table 7 Panel estimations of different time periods with dummy variables
Estimated coefficient Sample mean Contribution (weight)
1999q1–2003q4
FPF 1.068*** (0.118) 0.186 0.20
FS 1.297*** (0.059) 0.478 0.62
FCM 0.488*** (0.089) 0.269 0.13
2004q1–2008q2
FPF 0.304*** (0.079) 0.289 0.09
FS 1.38*** (0.057) 0.536 0.74
FCM 0.409*** (0.079) 0.319 0.13
2008q3–2012q4
FPF 0.878*** (0.076) 0.312 0.27
FS 1.298*** (0.081) 0.299 0.39
FCM 0.924*** (0.084) 0.258 0.24
Sum of contributions (R2) are: 0.95 for 1999q1–2003q4; 0.96 for 2004q1–2008q2; 0.90 for
2008q3–2012q4
*** Indicates level of significance at 1%. Standard errors in parentheses
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measure based on the financial stress index, FSI, developed and made available by
Duprey et al. (2015). This indicator is obtained on the basis of the stress on three
financial market segments (equity, bond and foreign exchange rate) by using two
variables for each segment. Stress in the equity market is captured by the monthly
realized volatility (computed as the monthly average of absolute daily log-returns of
the real stock price index) and by the cumulative maximum loss (the maximum loss
compared to the highest level of the stock market over two years). Stress in the bond
market is measured by the monthly realized volatility (computed as the monthly
average of absolute daily changes in the real yield on 10-year government bonds)
and by the cumulative difference (the maximum increase in basis points of the real
government bond spread with respect to Germany over a two-year rolling window).
Stress in the exchange rate market is measured by means of realized volatility
(computed as the absolute value of the monthly growth rate of the real effective
exchange rate) and by the cumulative change over six months. After harmonizing
these indicators with the empirical cumulative density function (see Hollo et al.
2012), the three sub-indexes measuring the stress in each segment are obtained by
averaging the two variables computed for each of them. Finally, the financial stress
measure is obtained by aggregating the time-varying cross correlations of these
indexes. The monthly data provided by the authors have been transformed into
quarterly observations and then the financial stability indicator has been obtained
as9 FS2i;t ¼ 1 FSIi;t.
The results of the estimation are reported in Table 8, panel B and are almost
identical to the results obtained with our financial stability indicator as reported in
Table 4.
Table 8 Panel estimation of the trilemma controlling for different financial stability indexes
Estimated coefficient Sample mean Contribution (weight)
Panel A
FPF 0.381*** (0.053) 0.259 0.10
FS1 1.335*** (0.036) 0.504 0.67
FCM 0.568*** (0.049) 0.283 0.16
Panel B
FPF 0.66*** (0.532) 0.259 0.17
FS2 1.189*** (0.036) 0.489 0.58
FCM 0.593*** (0.053) 0.283 0.17
Sum of contributions (R2) with FS1 = 0.93
Sum of contributions (R2) with FS2 = 0.92
*** Indicates level of significance at 1%. Standard errors in parentheses
9 Where the usual normalization and winsorization have been applied.
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5.2.2 Alternative fiscal flexibility indicators
Our definition of fiscal flexibility has been identified on the possibility of central
governments to pursue national economic and political objectives and deviate from
the fiscal policy in the rest of the union. Clearly, this is not the only possible
interpretation and many other alternatives can be considered. It can be argued that
the Stability and Growth Pact does not necessarily force all member states to
implement similar fiscal policies and that this depends on the general economic
conditions related to the business cycles in member countries. Thus, as alternative
measure of fiscal policy independence, we also present an index based on the
correlation between the domestic fiscal stance and the domestic output-gap. The
index is calculated as follows:
FPF1i;t ¼
corr Pdefi;t;DGAPi;t
 þ 1
2
ð10Þ
where Pdefi;t represents the primary deficit in country i at time t, while DGAPi;t is
obtained as the difference between the output-gap in country i (obtained with the HP
filter) and its average in the rest of the EMU.10 The results of the estimation with
this alternative indicator are reported in Table 9, panel A, and they confirm that the
highest weight in the trilemma configuration has been for financial stability over
fiscal flexibility. However, in this case the difference between these two weights is
slightly lower when compared to our results in Table 4.
As we understand that both fiscal policy flexibility indexes adopted may have
some elements of arbitrariness, we employ a third indicator based on institutional
factors. The measure adopted is the fiscal rule index, FRI, provided by the European
Commission. The FRI index is constructed by first assigning a strength value to each
Table 9 Panel estimation of the trilemma controlling for different fiscal policy flexibility indexes
Estimated coefficient Sample mean Contribution (weight)
Panel A
FPF1 0.774*** (0.047) 0.348 0.27
FS 0.938*** (0.046) 0.443 0.42
FCM 0.846*** (0.049) 0.283 0.24
Panel B
FPF2 0.824*** (0.047) 0.405 0.33
FS 1.029*** (0.041) 0.443 0.46
FCM 0.487*** (0.053) 0.283 0.14
Sum of contributions (R2) with FPF1 = 0.93
Sum of contributions (R2) with FPF2 = 0.93
*** Indicates level of significance at 1%. Standard errors in parentheses
10 Also in this case we have first regressed the primary deficit on GDP for each country and then we have
used the residuals as a measure of the fiscal policy (Pdefi;t) in each member state.
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existing rule, and then by computing a weighted sum of all fiscal rule strength
indexes for each member country. Assuming that a decrease in FRI (a decrease in
the number and strength of fiscal rules) implies an increase in fiscal policy
flexibility, we have employed this index in order to construct another measure of
fiscal policy flexibility as:
FPF2i;t ¼ 1
FRIi;t  FRImin
FRImax  FRImin ð11Þ
The results of the estimation of Eq. (5), with the indicator (11) substituting (3),
are reported in Table 9, panel B. Also under this specification, our estimation
confirms the existence of the trilemma and the highest weight for financial stability
in the trilemma configuration. As the main difference with respect to our previous
results, the estimated weight of fiscal policy flexibility by means of FPF2 results to
be the highest (0.33) when compared to the results in Table 4 (0.19) and Table 9
panel A (0.27).
5.2.3 Alternative free capital mobility indicator
The employed capital mobility indicator is a de facto one based on the volumes of
capital flows and their time variation. This implies that changes in our indicator may
also be the consequence of deleveraging rather than of actual restrictions on capital
mobility.
Thus, in this section we report the results of the trilemma estimation obtained by
using a de jure measure of free capital mobility. To this aim, we employ the overall
capital control indicator proposed by Ferna´ndez et al. (2016). This indicator
considers capital controls on inflows and outflows for 10 asset categories and it is
built on the data in Schindler (2009) and on the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). The indicator ranges between
0 and 1, with 0 representing no capital restrictions. Thus, for our analysis we
consider the normalized complement to 1 of the index in order to retrieve a measure
of free capital mobility. As the original dataset is provided in yearly frequency, we
have also transformed the series in quarterly by linear approximation.
The results of the estimation with this index are reported in Table 10 and they
still support the existence of the trilemma. In this case the trilemma composition
seems to change as both FCM1 and FS score a weight of 0.38, while the weight of
FPF does not significantly change (0.18). However, it seems worth noting that this
Table 10 Panel estimation of the trilemma controlling for different free capital mobility index
Estimated coefficient Sample mean Contribution (weight)
FPF 0.693*** (0.046) 0.259 0.18
FS 0.856*** (0.044) 0.443 0.38
FCM1 0.725*** (0.039) 0.521 0.38
Sum of contributions (R2) = 0.94
*** Indicates level of significance at 1%. Standard errors in parentheses
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result may have been determined also by the limited time variation of the de jure
index and by the fact that 31% of the observations in our panel are equal to 1 for
FCM1. The latter is also reflected in the high sample mean of FCM1.
5.3 Specificity of the trilemma
As already stressed in Sect. 2, the understanding and the formulation of the
presented trilemma are deeply grounded in some of the key features of the EMU. In
the absence of a political and budgetary union, rules able to guarantee fiscal policy
discipline are required. Setting up common rules implies that all member countries
have to adhere to them and reduce their freedom in fiscal decisions. Furthermore,
members of a monetary union issue debt in a currency that they do not control. As a
result, the governments of these countries cannot guarantee that the cash will always
be available in order to pay out bondholders at maturity. These elements make
countries involved in a monetary union more fragile with respect to negative
financial shocks. This should not be the case in ‘‘stand-alone countries’’, i.e.
countries outside a monetary union. Consequently, the monetary union trilemma
should not apply to stand-alone countries as they do not face common fiscal rules
with other countries, issue debt in a currency on which have full control and are not
necessarily required to be financially integrated with other countries.
Then, our last exercise in order to assess the robustness of our results is intended
to analyze the specificity of the estimated trilemma for the EMU countries. To this
aim we test the existence of the trilemma in a group of stand-alone countries
(Australia, Japan, Russia, USA and UK) based on indicators (1), (2), and (3).11 In
order to have a similar benchmark in terms of countries and time, we also present
the results of the estimation of Eq. (5) for the EMU countries in our dataset divided
in two sub-groups (core and periphery) and spanning the same period covered by the
stand-alone countries dataset.
As reported in Table 11, the trilemma still applies to the two EMU sub-groups as
the estimated coefficients have positive sign and are statistically significant at 1%.
The same does not seem to apply to the panel estimation for the stand-alone
Table 11 Specificity of the trilemma (panel)
Stand-alone countries EMU-core EMU-periphery
FPF 0.152*** (0.029) 0.931*** (0.074) 0.372*** (0.094)
FS 1.517*** (0.009) 1.296*** (0.052) 1.129*** (0.067)
FCM 0.034 (0.024) 0.489*** (0.058) 1.132*** (0.123)
Stand-alone countries: Australia, Japan, Russia, USA, UK
EMU-core: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Netherlands
EMU-periphery: Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain
Estimations cover the period 2000q2–2012q4 for each group of countries
*** Indicates level of significance at 1%, no asterisk indicates no significance at 10%. Standard errors in
parentheses
11 Given data availability, the period covered for these countries is 2000q2–2012q4.
198 R. R. Canale et al.
123
countries because statistical significance is not confirmed for all of the estimated
coefficients. This suggests the rejection of the trilemma for such countries. In order
to further investigate this aspect, we also perform single countries estimations of the
trilemma equation in the stand-alone group. The results from such estimations are
reported in Table 12 and they strengthen the evidence from the panel regression as
the negative estimated coefficients strongly deny the suitability of the trilemma for
this group of stand-alone countries.
Then, thanks to this specific additional analysis, we have also provided evidence
of the fact that the trilemma seems to be specifically working for countries in the
EMU and policymakers of stand-alone countries should not be confronted with such
a policy objectives trade-off.
6 Conclusion
The recent economic turmoil in the Eurozone has called interest on the interactions
between financial markets and fiscal policy and has stressed the difficulties in
reconciling the contemporaneous existence of capital market integration, financial
stability and the ability to manage fiscal accounts.
In this paper we have contributed to this literature by empirically investigating
the existence of a policy trilemma faced by member countries of the Eurozone
involving free capital mobility, financial stability and fiscal policy flexibility. To
this aim, we have estimated the existence and the configuration of such a trade-off in
a panel of 11 EMU member countries by adopting the methodology introduced by
Aizenman et al. (2008) together with other alternative methods proposed in the
literature.
The existence of such a trade-off has been proven for both the entire panel and
single member countries in the dataset. The estimated trilemma implies that
member-countries face a trade-off between the three policy objectives and that they
cannot fully achieve free capital mobility, financial stability and fiscal policy
flexibility contemporaneously. In terms of the trilemma configuration, we have
shown that member states have mainly focused on financial stability and have
minimized fiscal policy flexibility whenever possible. Nevertheless, our results
suggest that during the crisis financial stability has decreased and fiscal policies
have been more oriented towards national objectives.
Table 12 Specificity of the trilemma (single countries)
Australia Japan Russia USA UK
FPF - 0.075 (0.051) 0.029 (0.077) - 0.014 (0.049) 0.059 (0.043) 0.069 (0.061)
FS 1.499*** (0.021) 1.462*** (0.038) 1.596*** (0.037) 1.541*** (0.018) 1.509*** (0.015)
FCM 0.014 (0.035) 332.891*** (90.781) 0.208*** (0.07) - 2.995 (42.785) - 1.328 (5.042)
*** Indicates level of significance at 1%, no asterisk indicates no significance at 10%. Standard errors in
parentheses
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Although our results on the configuration and time variation of the trade-off
certainly require future additional research, the result concerning the existence of
the trilemma is of paramount importance in itself. This is due to the fact that the
existence of such a policy trilemma can be considered as an additional factor
supporting the ongoing reforms of the governance of the EMU aiming at
safeguarding economic stability. The reforms regarding the banking union, the
prudential supervisory role of the ECB and the provision of a lender of last resort
are intended to weaken the influence of financial markets on fiscal policies, reduce
financial instability and minimize the risk of self-fulfilling crises (see Obsfield 2013;
Pisani-Ferry 2012; De Grauwe 2011). Then, under these circumstances, beneficial
effects for the Eurozone should be guaranteed also in terms of the trade-off analyzed
in this paper.
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